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Poor coverage of the top in wealth surveys conceals the extent of wealth inequality.
The literature mitigates this shortcoming by enriching survey data with rich lists and
estimating the top tail with a Pareto distribution. However, recent studies rely on ad-hoc
assumptions for some of the required parameters. We suggest a unified regression ap-
proach to estimate all parameters of a Pareto distribution jointly and extend our analysis
with a more flexible three-parameter Generalized Pareto estimation. We introduce a new
database of national rich lists (ERLDB) as an alternative to commonly used global rich
lists to combine with survey data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey
(HFCS 2017). Our findings for 14 European countries show that wealth is more concen-
trated than surveys suggest, with almost doubling Top 1% shares in the most extreme
cases. In contrast, countries with successful oversampling strategies tend to experience
only minor changes in inequality metrics.
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1 Introduction
The distribution of wealth is infamously top-heavy, thus the richest parts of the population
are crucial for a comprehensive picture of economic inequality. A profound understanding
of the top tail is also important for economic policy design with regard to wealth taxation
which usually affects richest households most. Survey data is the most important source of
information in these matters but comes with flaws concealing the extent of inequality.
In this paper, we adopt Vilfredo Pareto’s (1965 [1896]) intuition that inequality within
segments increases with wealth and estimate the wealth of the richest percentiles in 14 Euro-
pean countries. We present a new unified approach to estimating all aspects of the standard
two-parameter Pareto distribution as well as the three-parameter Generalized Pareto distri-
bution without the need for arbitrary choices. To add very rich households to our analysis
with Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) data, we introduce the most com-
prehensive data collection of journalistic rich lists so far, the European Rich List Database
(ERLDB). Interpolating the top tail, we find that the wealth share of the Top 1% substan-
tially increases in all, and almost doubles in the most extreme cases.
The literature on wealth inequality recognizes a striking pattern at the top percentiles,
which closely resemble a Pareto distribution (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000). This distribution
is characterized by the fact that inequality between observations increases with their relative
wealth, such that wealth in the 99th percentile is more unequally distributed than in the
98th, which in turn is more unequal than in the 97th. As the availability and quality of
administrative tax data deteriorated in past decades (Krenek and Schratzenstaller, 2018),
the investigation of wealth distribution relies on surveys such as the Survey of Consumer
Finances in the United States or the HFCS for Eurozone countries. However, the richest
households are less likely to be captured correctly than their lower percentile counterparts
due to (1) a higher likelihood to refuse participation (Kennickell and Woodburn, 1997) and
(2) more complex financial portfolios favoring underreporting (Vermeulen, 2016b). This
leads to a gap between aggregate survey wealth and assets recorded in National Accounts
(Chakraborty and Waltl, 2018), as well as between the highest survey observations and
journalistic evidence, such as the Forbes list of billionaires. The literature dubbed this the
problem of ”the missing rich”.
The recent empirical literature approximates the tail of the distribution by using survey
data as the lower and rich list observations as the upper bound to interpolate a Pareto
distribution (Vermeulen, 2014). Vermeulen (2016a) finds that in eight European countries,
the wealth share of the Top 1% is underestimated by between one (lower bound in Spain) and
11 percentage points (upper bound in Austria). More recent studies provide detailed results
for a set of European countries based on the same methodological fundament (Eckerstorfer
et al., 2016; Chakraborty and Waltl, 2018; Bach et al., 2019; Brzezinski et al., 2020). The
estimation of a Pareto distribution hinges on two decisive parameters (location parameter
wmin and shape parameter α), and a threshold w0 that determines the wealth above which
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observations become unreliable and are replaced by simulated new entries (Dalitz, 2016).
The literature so far relied on best guesses or visual inspection for some of these parameters,
which makes their methods hard to replicate with respect to time and location, and subject
to methodological scrutiny.
In this paper, we combine techniques to estimate the parameters of Pareto distributions
in linear regressions and for the first time provide a unified regression approach to estimate all
aspects of the distribution jointly. We present results for the most comprehensive collection
of countries so far by introducing a new European Rich List Database (ERLDB). Since we
abstain from visual inspection or arbitrary parameter choices, our method is easily scaled to
a large sample and seamlessly adapt to different survey designs or wealth regimes between
countries. We furthermore extend the Pareto approach by estimating a three-parameter
Generalized Pareto distribution, which is more flexible to varying inequality with increasing
percentiles due to its additional scale parameter. Our unified approach closes the gap be-
tween survey and ERLDB data, and shows how severely surveys underestimate the wealth
of the super-rich. The robustness of our approach is emphasized by the fact that inequality
metrics hardly change in those countries that use administrative tax data or apply extensive
oversampling in their surveys.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the HFCS survey
data and introduces the ERLDB. Section 3 compares and combines estimation techniques to
Pareto distributions in the literature and extends the methodology by using a Generalized
Pareto distribution. Section 4 gives the results from both estimation procedures before
section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Surveys on assets and liabilities like the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS)
are valuable sources for the distributional analysis of household wealth. Despite enormous
compiling efforts, the data is biased for two main reasons. First, wealth distributions are
heavily skewed and a large fraction of total wealth is concentrated at the top. A small
random sample thus may not adequately represent the full distribution of wealth when very
rich households are not drawn into the sample. Second, the participation rate of households
in wealth surveys decreases with wealth resulting in differential nonresponse (Davies and
Shorrocks, 2000). Both lead to an under-representation of rich households in survey data, and
thus an underestimation of total wealth and distributional indicators that focus on the top.
We address these shortcomings of wealth surveys in section 2.2 and introduce the European
Rich List Database (ERLDB) as a complementary data source. It covers information on the
top of the wealth distribution for 20 European countries based on national rich lists. The
combination of HFCS and ERLDB constitute the basis of our estimation strategy, which
aims for a more comprehensive picture of aggregate wealth and wealth inequality. In total,
we are able to include 14 countries for which both HFCS and ERLDB data are available.
3
2.1 Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS)
The Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) is a harmonized survey of house-
hold finances coordinated by the European Central Bank (ECB). Its third wave was mainly
conducted in 2017 by national central banks and covers all 19 Eurozone countries as well as
Croatia, Hungary, and Poland. The survey sample of nearly 28, 000 observations represents
167 million households and provides detailed information on real assets, financial assets, as
well as liabilities (ECB, 2020). For many countries in Europe, the HFCS is the first and
only, for others the most comprehensive micro dataset on wealth that enables distributional
analysis.
The preferred survey mode of the HFCS is based on computer assisted personal inter-
views (CAPI) supported by consistency checks and automatic data storage. Only Poland,
Finland, and the Netherlands decided to conduct other non-face-to-face survey modes. Par-
ticipating households may refuse to answer difficult or sensitive questions which leads to
item nonresponse. Mis-information about the financial situation or the wish to conceal, on
the other hand, might lead to factually wrong answers, i.e. under- or overreporting. Both
item nonresponse and misreporting are problematic if they are not uniformly distributed as
this results in systematic biases in statistical analysis. The HFCS surveyors counter these
problems with a multiple imputation strategy where missing and implausible values are es-
timated five times. The differences between the five sets of observations account for the
underlying level of imputation uncertainty (ECB, 2020).
Despite various efforts to comprehensively cover the whole population, Davies and Shorrocks
(2000) point out that wealth surveys struggle to accurately describe the top of the distribu-
tion. Many reasons for nonresponse apply to all sampled households (survey nonresponse)
and can partially be addressed by adjusting survey weights ex post. However, there is evi-
dence that unit nonresponse is correlated with household wealth and thus results in differ-
ential unit nonresponse (Kennickell and Woodburn, 1997; D’Alessio and Faiella, 2002). The
reasons why it is more difficult to contact wealthy respondents are manifold (ECB, 2020):
they are more likely to be absent for longer time periods, live in several residences, and
are more able to protect their privacy. Furthermore, perceived and actual time restrictions
of wealthy respondents and the reluctance to disclose information on the financial situa-
tion increase their refusal rate. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to oversample affluent
households in wealth surveys to adequately capture the whole distribution (Kennickell, 2008;
Bricker et al., 2016; Pfeffer et al., 2016).
An efficient survey design includes a disproportionally high number of wealthy households
ex ante in the sampling frame. Most of the countries participating in HFCS implemented
such oversampling strategies to correct for differential unit nonresponse. The success heavily
depends on the ability to identify and reach wealthy households in order to actually interview
them. Oversampling strategies fall back on individual or group-wise information correlated
with wealth and influence the sample design as well as post-survey adjustments. While
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some countries, for example France, use individual information on personal wealth from
register data, others rely on proxies like income (Finland), electricity consumption (Cyprus),
or dwelling size (Portugal). Countries without access to individual data consider regional
information like property prices to oversample wealthy street sections, like Germany and
Slovakia (ECB, 2020). However, oversampling of households with estimated wealth above
a certain threshold does not ensure accurate coverage of the top if it is outweighed by unit
nonresponse.
The extent of oversampling is measured in the effective oversampling rate which captures
the number of unweighted households with wealth above a certain percentile that has been
derived from the weighted data. When the net sample includes a relatively large number
of affluent households with small average weights, this indicates high effective oversampling
(ECB, 2020). Table A.1 presents the oversampling strategies and the effective Top 5%
oversampling rates for the countries in our study. Values range from −15% in Austria with
no oversampling to +278% in France where oversampling is based on administrative wealth
tax data.
2.2 European Rich List Database (ERLDB)
Despite the various oversampling attempts in the HFCS, survey aggregates on household
wealth usually are considerably lower than macroeconomic aggregates from National Ac-
counts (Vermeulen, 2016a; Chakraborty and Waltl, 2018). This corresponds to the obser-
vation that the highest fortunes in HFCS data are substantially smaller than evidence from
journalistic rich lists. Thus, studies focusing on the top of the wealth distribution often rely
on such lists to enrich survey data with information on very affluent households. For this
reason, we have collected lists from 20 countries with roughly 9, 000 observations and make
them publicly available for research as European Rich List Database. Figure 1 shows the
geographical coverage of the ERLDB and compares the maximum values in the HFCS with
minimum values in the rich lists.
While it is convenient for cross-country studies to use the international billionaires list by
US-magazine Forbes, national rich lists feature some important advantages. First, the Forbes
list only contains US-Dollar billionaires, whereas rich lists compiled by national magazines
or newspapers mostly comprise observations with much less wealth. Second and related,
national rich lists provide significantly more entries and list up to 1, 000 observations for a
single country while the Forbes list totals roughly 2, 100 observations worldwide. National
rich lists might thus improve wealth estimates particularly in countries with only a few entries
in the Forbes list (Bach et al., 2019). Third, local journalists might have better insights and
intuition for the wealth portfolios of the rich in a country than an international team of
reporters. Although editors and journalists do their best to accurately cover the super-rich,
these national lists also have weaknesses.
First, it is questionable whether rich lists are exhaustive. Individuals can opt out for
5
Figure 1: Wealth in Surveys and Rich Lists
privacy issues or simply do not appear in the list although they would qualify (Kennickell,
2003). Second, investigators rely on public information which may be flawed particularly
with regard to private assets and liabilities. Moreover, some assets are difficult to assess, for
instance art collections and business wealth in form of non-traded corporate shares. Addi-
tionally, debts are less visible than assets, and potentially cause net worth to be overstated
(Kopczuk, 2015; Atkinson, 2008; Davies and Shorrocks, 2000). Third, rich lists often mix
individuals, families, and family clans. Accordingly, Bach et al. (2019) show for Germany’s
Manager Magazin list that some individual observations actually consist of several house-
holds.
Despite these methodological deficiencies, rich lists provide important information on
individuals and families that are not captured in wealth surveys. We thus enrich survey data
from HFCS with ERLDB data for 14 countries. In some cases, the interview period of the
HFCS and the reference period of the national rich list do not match and we have to choose
the closest year. When the interview period in HFCS was not restricted to a calendar year,
we select the year in which the most interviews were conducted. Table A.1 presents detailed




Spanning over times and places, the distribution of income and wealth in capitalist societies
takes a remarkably similar form. It was early Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1965 [1896])
who recognized that 80 % of Italian land was owned by the richest 20 % of the population.
He quickly extended this observation for different forms of property to brand Pareto’s Law.
The 80 - 20 ratio can be generalized to a power law distribution




with wealth w and wmin as the lower bound of observations closely following a Pareto’s
Law. The distribution has a linear relationship between the logarithm of the complementary
cumulative distribution log(1− F (w)) and the logarithm of the wealth variable log(x) as in





A corresponding log-log plot reveals the characteristic pattern at a glance, adding to
the theory’s popularity. More recently, the inequality literature has found that the Pareto
distribution is a good approximation for the tail of the wealth distribution, i.e. the inequality
among rich households (see e.g. Davies and Shorrocks, 2000 or Gabaix, 2016).
In this paper, we combine various elements from the literature estimating the Pareto tail.
We exploit the linear relationship of the logarithms and apply linear regression, but include
Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011)’s rank correction of the left-hand side as well as Chakraborty
and Waltl (2018)’s insight that median quantile regression is more robust to outliers (Koenker





) + α log(wmin)︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
−α log(wi) (3)
where i is a decreasing ranking with i = 1 indicating the richest household, N is the sum
of total weights, N̄ is the average weight of an observation, and N̄fi denotes the average
weight of the first highest i observations. α gives the slope of the log-linearized plot, it is
the inequality parameter of the distribution. A smaller α corresponds to higher inequality
within the tail.
We use both HFCS survey and ERLDB data for the regression. We decide on the
location parameter wmin by comparing the root mean squared errors (RMSE) for a wide
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range of potential values. This makes use of the interpretation of the RMSE as a measure
of linearity and is based on Langousis et al. (2016)’s estimation procedure for Generalized
Pareto distributions. Figure 2 illustrates the procedure.
Figure 2: Determination of wmin
Note: This figure is based on 1st implicate of HFCS 2017 data for Germany.
There are other approaches of estimating wmin, Vermeulen (2016b) does his calculations
for a set of potential location parameters, while Clauset et al. (2009)’s method of calculating
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov metric of distance between the empirical and theoretical distribution
for a number of wmin candidates applies a similar logic as RMSE minimization.
The motivation of our analysis is the gap between survey and anecdotal evidence on
wealth, which we rationalize by suspecting differential underreporting and nonresponse bias
following Vermeulen (2016b). A third parameter w0 indicates a threshold in the tail above
which we do not trust the survey data to be complete. We make use of Eckerstorfer et al.
(2016)’s argument that this point should coincide with the transition from continuous to
discrete survey observations. We adapt Dalitz (2016)’s intuition that this transition can be
found where the empirical density function of the data falls below the theoretical probability
density function. Equations 4 and 5 define the equality condition for ŵ0, which we determine
numerically:
















×w−(α+1)0 = 0, (5)
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Let n(wi) be the weight of some household i, and h be the bandwidth for the kernel
estimation, which we choose using Sheather and Jones (1991)’s procedure.
Note that the procedure includes a normalizing constant C, which adjusts the number
of tail observations such that the sum of weights in the population before and after re-
estimation remains the same (Eckerstorfer et al., 2016). C shifts the theoretical PDF up or
down, and is crucial for finding the intersection of theoretical and empirical densities. Figure
3 illustrates the numerically derived result for one HFCS implicate in Germany.
Figure 3: Tail histogram with wmin and w0
Note: This figure is based on 1st implicate of HFCS 2017 data for Germany.
We prefer this algorithmic approach to visual inspection, because the latter is somewhat
arbitrary but also impractical for analysis over multiple countries and implicates. Further-
more, Dalitz (2016) points out that inequality metrics of data with re-estimated Pareto
tails vary substantially for different values of w0. The distance between ŵmin and ŵ0 is
an indicator of how well surveyors were able to battle differential biases among the richest
households; as different participating central banks of the HFCS apply different oversam-
pling strategies we do expect some variation here. This too emphasizes the need for a flexible
and unambiguous procedure.
Finally, we simulate a new tail above w0. We calculate the number of households with
wealth above w0 according to a Pareto(α̂, ŵmin) distribution by extrapolating the number of
households between ŵmin and ŵ0 with the cumulative density function above ŵ0 (1−F (ŵmin)





















and a uniform household weight of 1. The combination of simulated observations and all
survey entries below ŵ0 gives our re-estimated population. We calculate inequality metrics,
such as the share of wealth held by the Top 1%, Top 5%, and Top 10%, P99/P50 quantile
ratio, or the Gini coefficient. Figure 4 illustrates the individual steps as well as the main
parameters.
Figure 4: Cumulative Density Function of HFCS, Rich List, and Pareto Simulation
Note: This figure is based on the 1st HFCS implicate and ERLDB data from 2017 for Germany.
3.2 Generalized Pareto Approach
Pareto’s law approximates the tail of observable phenomena surprisingly well, but the sim-
plicity of the two-parameter Pareto distribution implies a certain rigidity. Atkinson (2017)
points out that Vilfredo Pareto envisioned an upper tail distribution that requires a rejection
of a constant shape parameter α and and calls for a richer functional form to approximate
economic phenomena at the top.
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A recent approach by Blanchet et al. (2017) uses a non-parametric definition of power
laws and implements Generalized Pareto Curves with varying α values along the top tail to
interpolate tabulations of exhaustive tax data with significantly higher precision compared
to non-exhaustive survey data.
We rely on survey and ERLDB data and improve the functional form of the standard
Pareto distribution by introducing the Generalized Pareto distribution. It is more flexible,









with a location parameter µ, a shape parameter ξ, and a scale parameter σ. Its shape
parameter ξ relates to Pareto’s α such that ξ = 1α (Jenkins, 2017). The location parameter
µ has the same interpretation as wmin and indicates the threshold above households’ wealth
approximately follows a Generalized Pareto (GP) distribution. We adopt the standard Pareto
notation and use αGP and wmin instead of ξ and µ because the two parameters share a
similar interpretation. The scale parameter σ determines the drift towards the end of the
tail and defines a higher or lower wealth concentration compared to the two-parameter
Pareto distribution, which is a nested special case of the Generalized Pareto distribution
with wmin = σξ and therefore no drift by definition.
Our Generalized Pareto approach is an extension of our efforts outlined in section 3.1
to approximate the top tail of the wealth distribution. We build on our already detected
threshold wmin from the standard Pareto and estimate a Generalized Pareto distribution
that may fit the tail better. For a given wmin we estimate the scale and shape parameter.
Langousis et al. (2016) show that if the scaled excesses of a random variable over some
location parameter wmin follow a Generalized Pareto distribution, the scaled excesses for any
threshold u ≥ wmin are also Generalized Pareto distributed with the same shape parameter
1
αGP
. Furthermore, the scale parameters σu depends linearly on the scale parameter of the
threshold wmin, the shape parameter, and the excess over u. The scaled excess of a random
variable over any threshold u is defined as e(u) = E[W − u | W > u]. Equation 9 gives the
linear relationship for σu, equation 10 the expected value of the excess over u.












= β0 + β1u (10)
The linear relationship in equation 10 allows for a linear regression based estimation
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of both the scale and shape parameters, since β1 = 1αGP /(1 −
1
αGP
) and β0 = (σu −
1
αGP
wmin)/(1− 1αGP ). Then,
1
αGP




We deploy the empirical strategy of Langousis et al. (2016) to our weighted survey data.
We estimate the weighted mean excesses e(w) = E[W−u | W > u] above different thresholds
ui = Wi,n with i = 1, 2, ..., n − 20. Omitting the last (i.e. largest) 20 observations ensures
that mean excesses are calculated based on at least 20 observations. This effectively pairs
every observation wi with a mean excess value e(wi) = E[W − wi | W > wi]. For each
observation wi, i = 1, 2, ..., n − 20, we calculate the conditional weighted excess variance
V ar[W − wi | W > wi] to account for the increasing estimation variance of e(wi) in wi.
The weights are calculated as vi = (N − i)/(V ar[W − wi | W > wi]. Finally, we perform a
weighted least squares estimation corresponding to equation 10 with weights vi.
From the literature on Pareto α estimations, we know that quantile median regressions
of linear relationships derived from a distribution’s density function is often more robust to
outliers than ordinary least squares regression. Therefore we perform weighted least square
and quantile regressions and compare the results.
Our survey-data-driven approach indicates the transition threshold w0 where the empir-
ical density suggests that we should not trust the survey data above w0 to fully capture the
tail. Therefore we utilize the w0 estimates from the two-parameter Pareto approach and
obtain the length of the Generalized Pareto tail in the same way as in the previous section.
As a last step we simulate the tail above w0 according to our estimates and assign wealth
values to our new theoretical observations as in GPareto (α̂GP , σ̂, ŵmin)







This allows us to obtain the same standard metrics of inequality as in the standard Pareto
approach.
4 Results
We combine HFCS and ERLDB data to tackle underreporting and differential nonresponse
that is disproportionally prevalent among the super-rich and to gain better insight in the
wealth concentrated at the top. We apply a novel unified regression approach to the Pareto
distribution and incorporate findings of the recent literature on linearized parameter esti-
mation. While the Pareto approach allows us to close the gap between survey and rich list
observations, we extend the framework and estimate a three-parameter Generalized Pareto
distribution which is able to capture a ”drift” deviation from the linear relationship between
the logarithms of the complementary cumulative distribution function and wealth levels.
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The Generalized Pareto approach comes with a trade-off since it is more flexible and more
robust where differential underreporting is particularly prevalent but also more complex and
arduous to estimate.
With regard to the Pareto distribution, we estimate a location parameter wmin, that
marks the threshold where the data starts following a Pareto distribution, and a shape
parameter α that defines the degree of inequality in the tail. We estimate the Pareto pa-
rameters sequentially. First, we apply the median regression approach by Chakraborty and
Waltl (2018) to determine point estimates of α for a sequence of wmins. Then, we minimize
the regressions’ root mean squared error RMSE(w,α | wmin) and extract the corresponding
parameter values. Figure 5 illustrates average parameter estimates between implicates, while
we report the full list in Appendix B.
Figure 5: Parameters of estimation strategies
Note: This figure is based on all five implicates of HFCS 2017 data.
Our estimates for the location parameter wmin vary considerably across countries. For
Lithuania, the starting point of the Pareto tail is as low as the 39th percentile (e 36,400) of
the national net wealth distribution, while the threshold is at the 87th percentile (e 765, 600)
in Ireland. This wide range of location parameters indicates a considerable variety of wealth
accumulation regimes in Europe and mirrors different oversampling strategies. The variety of
13
best-fit location parameters also underline the advantage of a unified and rule-based approach
over arbitrary choices of wmin, especially when dealing with a multi-country panel.
The Pareto α in the lower left-hand panel of figure 5 determines the heaviness of the tail.
A smaller α implies higher inequality within the tail and, for a given location parameter,
also higher inequality across the whole population. Our estimates for the shape parameter
range from 1.32 in Austria to 1.89 in Finland. The results are consistent with the assertion
in Gabaix (2016) that parameter values around 1.5 are the norm for wealth distribution.
Our estimations are also in the range of values presented in the literature (Ferschli et al.,
2017; Vermeulen, 2018; Brzezinski et al., 2020), although our sample is based on the latest
HFCS wave, contains more countries, and applies a different estimation strategy than any
of these papers.
The parameters of the Pareto distribution are based on a combination of HFCS and
ERLDB data. In a next step, we determine a transition value w0 above which we discard
the data and simulate observations from the estimated Pareto distribution. The position
of the transition value mirrors the success of oversampling strategies to include very rich
observations and tackle differential nonresponse. The better the survey data is able to cover
the top, the higher is the threshold for data replacement. We find considerable correlation
between our estimated w0 and the effective HFCS oversampling rates in figure A.2, indicating
that successful oversampling significantly reduces the need to simulate wealth observations
in the top tail.
For the Generalized Pareto distribution, we build on the location parameter from the
Pareto estimation as both distributions share the same interpretation of wmin, that is the
threshold where the data starts to follow a (Generalized) Pareto distribution. The same
is true for the threshold w0 beyond which we believe differential nonresponse and under-
reporting render the survey data problematic. The additional scale parameter σ increases
the flexibility and determines the drift in the tail. When σ = wmin/αGP , the Generalized
Pareto equals a Pareto distribution. For a given αGP , a scale parameter σ > wmin/αGP
implies that the heaviness of the tail increases towards the top and results in a higher degree
of inequality. The shape and scale parameters for the Generalized Pareto distribution are
depicted in the lower right-hand panels of figure 5. For most countries, the scale parameter
is very close to the Pareto equivalent with no drift, except for Hungary, Latvia, and Lithua-
nia. In these countries, the heaviness decreases slightly towards the top of the tail in the
Generalized Pareto framework.
For each country and survey implicate, we simulate the tail above threshold w0 for
both the Pareto and the Generalized Pareto distribution by first calculating the number
of observations above w0 using the cumulative density function, and then assigning the
appropriate theoretical quantile to each observation. We combine the simulated tail with
survey observations and derive inequality metrics and top wealth shares for Pareto and
Generalized Pareto. Figure 6 shows wealth shares for the Top 1%, whereas table 1 provides
an overview of several inequality metrics for the raw and augmented survey data respectively.
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Figure 6: Net Wealth Share of Top 1%
Note: This figure is based on all five implicates of HFCS 2017 data.
It is noteworthy that countries with the highest oversampling rates, such as Finland,
France, Hungary, and Portugal experience the smallest changes in inequality measures.
These countries either rely on wealth tax data or available dwelling information for survey
oversampling, or obtain information on specific assets directly from administrative registers.
In this regard, Germany is an exception as top shares increase substantially with the Pareto
estimation even though the oversampling rate in HFCS is among the highest. This is how-
ever not surprising, as we can see in figure B.5 that the regional oversampling does not close
the gap between the HFCS and the rich list observations, compared to France in figure B.7,
where the oversampling is similarly high, but based on register wealth data. Additionally,
we observe very large changes in countries like Ireland, Netherlands, and Lithuania. Here,
the Top 1% shares almost double while Bottom 50% shares substantially decrease. Top 5%
and 10% shares resemble the patterns of Top 1%, albeit to a lesser extent.
Surprisingly, the more flexible Generalized Pareto simulation leads to smaller increases in
top shares. On average, they increase half as much compared to standard Pareto estimates
with two notable exceptions. First, France, Finland, and Belgium show even higher top
shares than in the Pareto approach. Second, Generalized Pareto estimates for Hungary do not
deviate from HFCS top shares indicating that there is no value added with the Generalized
Pareto simulation in this case. In a cross-country perspective, Generalized Pareto top shares
are closer together than Pareto top shares, which confirms our intuition that the greater
flexibility leads to higher robustness. However, it seems as if the strength of the Generalized
Pareto is to intervene when the survey deviates from the Pareto distribution, which comes
with a disadvantage at closing the linear gap.
The adjustment of the top tail of wealth distribution clearly has considerable effects
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on wealth aggregates, which can be seen in figure A.1. Particularly in Austria and in the
Netherlands, the Pareto estimation increases total wealth by more than 30 and 40 per cent
respectively. Countries with high oversampling rates and little need for data correction at
the top show only small changes in total wealth. While estimates for the Generalized Pareto
approach are mostly below the Pareto figures, they show a similar pattern between countries.
In sum, our estimates underscore that oversampling affluent households in survey data
makes a substantial difference and contributes to higher accuracy of survey-based wealth es-
timates. But not only the oversampling rate, also the quality of the data basis for the over-
sampling crucially determines this accuracy. Our non-discretionary algorithmic approach
proofs to be suited to correct for differences in the methodological differences in the sur-
veys. For countries where wealth-correlated information is limited, ex post adjustments by
means of national rich lists significantly increase aggregate wealth, top shares, and alterna-
tive measures of inequality - regardless of the specific estimation method. As survey data
underestimates inequality at the top, such efforts provide direly needed insights into wealth





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While the top of wealth distribution is particularly important for understanding economic
inequality, household surveys tend to cover the top percentiles insufficiently. We adjust
Eurozone wealth data from the HFCS for differential nonresponse and underreporting at
the top by adding observations from journalistic rich lists and suggesting a new approach to
Pareto estimation.
This approach substantially changes the sensitive top share metrics. We find that wealth
inequality is vastly underestimated by raw survey data. In the extreme cases of the Nether-
lands and Austria, the adaptation almost doubles the Top 1% shares to 38% and 37% re-
spectively. At the same time, inequality metrics change much less in countries like France
and Finland, where administrative information complements survey data. Generally, there
is a significant relationship between oversampling of rich households and the precision of
inequality metrics. This also implies a severe under-estimation of aggregate wealth in survey
data, ranging from only 2% in France, Finland or Belgium up to 25% in the Netherlands,
and Austria.
As observations of very rich individuals are essential for the quality of the tail estima-
tion, we introduce the most comprehensive compilation of journalistic rich lists to date as
European Rich List Database (ERLDB). This way, we are able to include several countries
for the first time in Pareto estimations based on national rich lists. We combine ERLDB
and HFCS data and present a unified algorithmic approach to parameterize the Pareto tail
of the distribution. Linearization of the cumulative density function allows for the intuitive
but robust median regression approach as our workhorse estimation technique, with the lo-
cation parameter, survey weight correction and thresholds for simulation being derived only
from the stochastic definition of the distribution or regression results. As we do not have
to rely on graphical inspection or discretionary decisions, our method is easily scaleable to
a large dataset and deals well with heterogeneity between countries. Furthermore, we can
seamlessly extend the two-parameter Pareto approach to its three-parameter generalization,
which allows for the distribution to drift towards decreasing or increasing inequality in the
”tail of the tail”. Our results suggest that the more flexible three-parameter estimation shows
a better fit in some countries but does not add value in other countries.
The paper highlights the potential of using journalistic evidence and meticulous sur-
vey designs to improve our understanding of wealth inequality. We combine multiple data
sources with a unified and robust estimation technique, which allows us to make use of all
available information. At the same time, closing the gap at the top shows that inequality in
many European countries is much higher than previously understood. This has important
implications for policy design with respect to wealth distribution such as in fiscal planning,
where affluent households might play a particularly important role.
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Figure A.1: Aggregate Wealth


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B CCDF and Pareto parameters
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Figure B.3: CCDF and estimated parameters: AT
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Figure B.4: CCDF and estimated parameters: BE
25
Figure B.5: CCDF and estimated parameters: DE
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Figure B.6: CCDF and estimated parameters: FI
27
Figure B.7: CCDF and estimated parameters: FR
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Figure B.8: CCDF and estimated parameters: HU
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Figure B.9: CCDF and estimated parameters: IE
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Figure B.10: CCDF and estimated parameters: IT
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Figure B.11: CCDF and estimated parameters: LT
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Figure B.12: CCDF and estimated parameters: LV
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Figure B.13: CCDF and estimated parameters: NL
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Figure B.14: CCDF and estimated parameters: PL
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Figure B.15: CCDF and estimated parameters: PT
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Figure B.16: CCDF and estimated parameters: SI
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